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Abstract 
Companies in Victorian Britain operated in a laissez-faire legal environment from the perspective of 
outside investors, implying that such investors were not protected by the legal system.  This paper seeks to 
identify the alternative mechanisms which outside shareholders used to protect themselves by examining 
the dividend policy and governance of over 800 publicly-traded companies at the beginning of the 1880s.  
We assess the importance of these mechanisms by estimating their impact on Tobin’s Q.  Our evidence 
suggests that dividends and well-structured and incentivised boards of directors may have played a role in 
protecting the interests of outside investors.     
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1. Introduction 
 
The British capital market underwent a great transformation in the nineteenth century in 
terms of the number and value of equity securities.1  The liberalisation of incorporation 
law and the establishment of regional stock exchanges removed supply constraints, whilst 
the increasing wealth and financial sophistication of the middle classes simultaneously 
increased the demand for publicly-traded equity.  The rapid growth in the number of 
companies issuing such equity raises the question as to how outside investors were 
assured that they would receive a return on their investment as well as their initial capital 
back.2  Recent academic studies have suggested that the legal system plays an important 
role in determining the level of protection enjoyed by outside shareholders.3 However, in 
the Victorian era, British company law and common-law principles were laissez-faire in 
this regard.4  How such shareholders protected themselves in this era against 
expropriation by corporate insiders (i.e. managers) is the subject under investigation in 
this article. 
 In this article, using data on over 800 companies, we examine whether dividends 
were an important means of protecting outside investors in Victorian capital markets.  
Dividends can be viewed as a substitute for legal protection as paying out substantial 
proportions of earnings prevents managers diverting cash flows and may submit them to 
                                                 
1 In terms of the growth in the number and value of equity securities in the nineteenth century see Acheson 
et al, ‘Rule Britannia’ and Grossman, ‘New indices’.  According to Michie, London Stock Exchange, p.89, 
the nominal value of company securities (apart from railways) quoted in the Stock Exchange Official List 
as a proportion of the total nominal value of listed securities was 5.5 per cent in 1853, 7.4 per cent in 1883, 
and 19.8 per cent by 1903.  
2 “Outside investors” in contrast to “insiders” are investors who are not directly involved in the governance 
of the firm.  They are also referred to in the literature as minority shareholders or investors.  
3 La Porta et al. ‘Legal determinants’, ‘Law and finance’, ‘Corporate ownership’, ‘Agency problems’, 
‘Investor protection’. 
4 Cheffins, ‘History’, ‘Does law matter?’; Cottrell, Industrial finance, chap. 3; Kennedy, Industrial 
structure, p.126. 
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the discipline of the capital markets.5  We also examine corporate governance 
mechanisms which may have played a role in protecting shareholders.  The effectiveness 
of dividends and these various governance mechanisms in protecting outside shareholders 
is tested by analysing their impact on corporate value as measured by Tobin’s Q.   
Our regression results suggest that dividends and well-structured and incentivised 
boards may have played a role in protecting shareholders.  In addition, there is some 
evidence to suggest that informal trust mechanisms (as measured by the proximity of 
investors to the company) played some role in protecting shareholders of locally-based 
companies. On the other hand, shareholder voting mechanisms don’t appear to have 
protected shareholders.     
The findings of this article may have some bearing on the long-running debate on 
the role of the capital markets in the alleged failure of the Victorian economy.6  The 
general claim is that there was a bias towards either foreign or safe securities.  Although 
investors have been largely absolved of blame, there is a view that financial infrastructure 
was in someway defective.7  In particular, the permissive nature of company law vis-à-
vis shareholders has been highlighted as a major cause of the bias towards safe 
securities.8   This article contributes to this debate by suggesting that investors may have 
been able to protect themselves in this laissez-faire legal environment.            
 Although this article focuses on Victorian capital markets, it has a broader 
significance for contemporary debates within financial economics.  Firstly, the results of 
this article suggest, contrary to the work of contemporary ‘law and finance’ scholars, that 
                                                 
5 Cheffins, ‘Dividends as a substitute’. 
6 See McCloskey, ‘Did Victorian Britain fail?’  
7 Edelstein, Overseas investment; Kennedy, Industrial structure.  See Michie, “Finance of innovation” for a 
strong rebuttal of the view that the capital markets failed British industry. 
8 Cottrell, Industrial finance, p.54; Crafts, ‘Long-run growth’, p.17; Kennedy, Industrial structure, p.127. 
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dividends may be a substitute for weak investor protection.9  Secondly, this article 
highlights the positive influence which relatively large and incentivised boards can have 
as well as the negative impact of independent directors who are selected because of their 
social standing rather than their expertise.         
 This article is organised as follows.  The next section examines the legal and 
extra-legal protection afforded Victorian investors.  The third section analyses the 
prevalence of different corporate governance mechanisms in our sample as well as the 
dividend policies of our sample firms.  The fourth section answers the question as to 
whether different means of protection were effective by examining their impact on 
Tobin’s Q.  The final section is a brief conclusion.    
                
2. Legal and extralegal protection for outside investors 
The gradual liberalisation of British incorporation law, commencing in the mid-1820s 
with the repeal of the infamous Bubble Act10 and the enactment of the Banking 
Copartnership Act11, and continuing with the Companies Act of 184412 and the 1855 
Limited Liability Act13, resulted in a myriad of Acts governing the incorporation of and 
regulating the behaviour of companies.  As a consequence, the 1862 Companies Act,14 
was passed to consolidate these (and other) existing pieces of legislation.  Apart from the 
railway companies, the vast majority of publicly-traded companies in the last quarter of 
                                                 
9 See La Porta et al., ‘Agency problems’. 
10 6 Geo. IV, c.91. 
11 7 Geo. IV, c.46.  This Act only permitted note-issuing banks to form on a joint-stock basis provided they 
were located outside a sixty-five mile radius of London.  Remaining subsequent legal doubts with regard to 
the establishment of non-issuing joint-stock banks within this radius were eliminated with the passage of 
the Bank of England Privileges Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will. 4, c.98). 
12 7 & 8 Vict., c.110.  This Act liberalized incorporation law by permitting firms to incorporate without 
explicit State permission. 
13 18 & 19 Vict., c.113.  This Act was repealed, but re-enacted in 1856 (19 & 20 Vict., c.47).   
14 25 & 26 Vict. c.89. 
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the nineteenth century came under the purview of this Act.  Railways and some utility 
companies, which had their own Acts of Parliament or Royal Charters granting them 
incorporation status, generally came under the purview of the Companies Clauses 
Consolidation Act (1845), which provided a standardized deed of settlement for 
companies created by special Acts of Parliament.15            
Shareholder protection was dealt with in a section of the 1862 Companies Act 
entitled “Provisions for Protection of Members”. This section of the Act required 
companies registered under the Act to hold an annual general meeting.16  It also 
empowered shareholders to appoint inspectors from the Board of Trade to investigate the 
books and affairs of the company.  However, it may have been very costly for outside 
shareholders to call for this appointment as shareholders having at least one-fifth of total 
capital had to make the application.  Consequently, as a contemporary legal scholar 
noted, this is “a very useful provision for the benefit and protection of shareholders, but 
one seldom taken advantage of”.17  Nevertheless, the existence of such a provision may 
have placed a lower limit on the expropriation activities of insiders.  
The 1862 Act didn’t impose a compulsory audit upon firms.18  The absence of 
rigorous disclosure requirements had the alleged effect of making uninvited takeovers 
impossible, which “merely served to heighten minority shareholders’ sense of ignorance 
                                                 
15 8 & 9 Vict. c.16.  See Cooke, Corporation, p.141 on this Act. 
16 Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c.89) 
17 Emden, Shareholders’ legal guide, p.121. 
18 Banks which had registered under the 1879 Companies Act (42 & 43 Vict. c.76) in order to convert from 
unlimited to limited liability were subject to a compulsory audit.  See Emden, Shareholders’ legal guide, 
p.101; Watts and Zimmerman, ‘Agency problems’, p.628.  Although the London Stock Exchange may have 
required a compulsory audit for new listings from the 1860s, it wasn’t until 1902 that companies listing on 
the London Stock Exchange had to have provisions in their articles to distribute their annual balance sheet 
to shareholders (Cheffins, Corporate ownership and control, p.95).  As to why many companies in our 
sample published their accounts whenever they were not required to, Cheffins, Corporate ownership and 
control, p.95 suggests that it was in a company’s self-interest to disclose information periodically to 
investors as an absence of such information would lead shareholders to exit the company.   
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and helplessness”.19 In addition, rights viewed by modern scholars as playing an 
important role in protecting minority shareholders were absent20: (a) insider trading was 
legal; (b) proxy voting was not mandated; (c) minority shareholders had no legal rights of 
acquiring board interest; (d) minority shareholders had no rights to force the company to 
purchase shares when they disagreed with fundamental management decisions; (e) the 
issuance of shares with unequal voting rights was not regulated; (f) shareholders did not 
have a pre-emptive legal right to buy new issues of stock; (g) the percentage of share 
capital required to call a meeting was not mandated.21     
Although the 1862 Companies Act didn’t mandate the above provisions, it did 
provide a list of default provisions for company constitutions in Table A of the Act.  
These provisions included: (a) proxy voting was permitted at shareholder meetings; (b) 
extraordinary general meetings could be called by not less than one fifth of shareholders; 
(c) shareholders had a pre-emptive right to purchase new issues; (d) an annual audit of 
company accounts.22  Companies could take or leave any or all of the provisions in Table 
A; and the extent to which provisions in Table A were adopted by companies is 
unknown, but it appears that the majority of companies didn’t just completely adopt the 
default provisions of Table A. For example, only 30.1 per cent of companies formed after 
1862 in our sample (see below) have graduated voting scales, which was the default 
provision in Table A.    
The Companies Clauses Consolidation Act (1845), similar to the 1862 Companies 
Act, required companies to hold annual meetings, but unlike the 1862 Act it mandated 
                                                 
19 Kennedy, Industrial structure, pp.126-7. 
20 La Porta et al. ‘Law and finance’, pp.1126-8. 
21 See Chadwyck-Healey, Treatise and Emden, Shareholders’ legal guide.  See also Cheffins, ‘Does law 
matter?’, pp.468-72.   
22 Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c.89), Table A, s. 27, 32, 48, 83. 
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proxy voting.  In addition, it required (without specifying to what extent) that directors 
must be shareholders and that companies are subject to a compulsory audit.  Section 75 of 
the Act stated that companies are free to have their own voting scales, but offered a 
default graduated voting scale of one vote for every share up to 10, one vote for every 
five shares up to 100, and one vote for every ten shares above 100.     
As well as weak protection afforded by legislative law, common-law judges in 
Victorian Britain were generally reluctant to interfere in internal business affairs in order 
to protect the interests of outside shareholders apart from cases where fraud was 
involved.23 In fact the judiciary was, if anything, unsympathetic towards the idea of 
protecting outside shareholders as was demonstrated in the famous 1843 case of Foss vs. 
Harbottle.24  The judge in this case ruled that  (a) where a director wrongs a company, 
the proper plaintiff is the company itself, not an individual shareholder, and (b) when a 
wrong is ratified by a majority of shareholders, an individual shareholder does not have a 
locus standi to proceed with an action against the company.      
The absence of strong legal protection in Victorian Britain is perhaps not 
surprising given that the legislature believed that laissez-faire theory and the practice of 
partnerships taught that capitalists could look after themselves.25  The ultimate effect, 
however, of this weak investor protection was to place “the company’s directors in 
virtually unchallengeable and unchecked possession of the company’s assets.”26  
Although corporate law provided little protection for outside shareholders, 
extralegal protection may have been provided by the organised securities markets.  For 
                                                 
23 See Emden, Shareholders’ legal guide, pp. 77-80. 
24 Foss vs Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 (Chancery Division) Wigram V-C. 
25 Jefferys, Business organisation, p.394. 
26 Kennedy, Industrial structure, p.126. 
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example, the London Stock Exchange from the 1850s imposed a two-thirds rule, which 
required that two-thirds of ordinary stock had to be in the hands of the public if a 
company wanted a full listing.27  Although this rule may have constrained market 
manipulation, it appears to have been easily circumvented.28  In addition, from about the 
late 1870s, companies listing on the London Stock Exchange were required to have in 
their articles a prohibition on directors using company funds to buy the company’s own 
stock.29  Apart from these rules, the self-regulated stock exchanges simply performed a 
screening function for initial public offerings in order to protect investors from fraudulent 
company promotions by requiring firms going public to disclose all material facts which 
may have affected the value of the company.30  Therefore neither parliamentary acts, 
common law judgements, nor the requirements of the stock exchange provided much 
protection to minority shareholders, which raises an important question: how did outside 
investors protect themselves in such an environment?31     
 
3. Corporate governance and dividends 
In order to address the issue of how investors protected themselves, we use governance 
data from Burdett’s Official Intelligence (BOI), financial data from the Investors’ 
Monthly Manual (IMM), and accounting data from  The Bankers’ Magazine, The 
Economist, and Bradshaw’s Railway Manual as well as  Burdett’s collection of annual 
                                                 
27 For the rules of the London Stock Exchange at this time see Chadwyck-Healey, Treatise, p.671. 
28 Cheffins, Corporate ownership and control, pp.225-30. 
29 Chadwyck-Healey, Treatise, p.671. 
30 Michie, London Stock Exchange, chap. 2. 
31 One possibility, which we control for in our regression analysis, is that the competitiveness of product 
markets in Victorian Britain prevented insiders from wasting resources as such behaviour would result in 
the firm being out-competed by its rivals (see Crafts, ‘Long-run growth’, p.17 and Hannah, Corporate 
economy, p.13).  However, competition on its own cannot completely eliminate costly insider diversion of 
resources (Hart, ‘Market mechanism’, Jensen, ‘Agency costs’, p.323). 
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reports held at the Guildhall Library.32  Appendix Table 1 defines our variables and gives 
the data sources for each variable.   
1883 is our sample year for several reasons.  Firstly, we wanted to examine the 
corporate governance of companies before the movement to reform company law, the 
need of which was highlighted by the Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade and 
Industry in the mid-1880s, which could have affected judge-made law.33  For example, 
the House of Lords in the 1887 case of Trevor vs. Whitworth ruled that a limited liability 
company could not buy its own shares, preventing directors from manipulating their 
stock prices using share repurchases.34  Secondly, we wanted to ensure that our sample 
included many of the new firms which had issued publicly-traded equity since the 1862 
Companies Act.  Thirdly, we wanted to examine the governance of companies before the 
London Stock Exchange instituted major changes in its microstructure, resulting in 
stricter listing requirements by the turn of the century.35  Finally, Burdett’s collection of 
annual reports at the Guildhall Library is only available from 1881 onwards, and the BOI 
is only available from 1882.       
As we are solely interested in the corporate governance of British firms, we 
ignore companies classified as foreign by BOI i.e. foreign railways and mines.  We define 
the remaining companies in BOI as being British if their registered head office as 
                                                 
32 These reports are bound by industry and are available on request from the Guildhall Library, Printed 
Books Section, Aldermanbury, London. 
33 Notably, the seminal study of Jefferys regards the mid-1880s as a major watershed in the development of 
the public company.  See Jefferys, Business organisation, p.144. 
34 Trevor vs. Whitworth 12 App Cos. 409.  The extent to which repurchases occurred prior to Trevor and 
Whitworth is unknown.  A listing on the London Stock Exchange required that articles of association 
restrain directors from using company funds to repurchase shares.  However, this only applied to 
companies which listed after the late 1870s.  Other listed companies had the ability to repurchase their own 
shares.  For example, bank deeds authorised directors to repurchase shares using bank funds, and there is 
evidence that they availed of this provision (Acheson and Turner, ‘Secondary market’, pp.146-8).   
35 Davis et al, ‘Listing requirements’. 
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reported in BOI was located in Britain or Ireland and their ordinary stock was chiefly 
traded in Britain or Ireland as reported in the IMM.  There were 823 British companies 
with publicly-traded ordinary (or common) stock, which were reported in both the IMM 
and BOI in 1883.36  Using the industry classification scheme of BOI, the three largest 
sectors in our sample are banks (157), industrial and commercial firms (123) and 
insurance companies (103). 
 
3.1 Concentrated ownership 
Ownership concentration data is not readily available for companies in the Victorian 
era.37  Nevertheless, we know that some publicly-traded companies in late Victorian 
Britain had diffuse ownership.  In particular, banks and railways, the two largest sectors 
in the equity market, did not typically have concentrated ownership due either to their 
size (in the case of railways and large London banks) or restrictions on the proportion of 
shares which one individual could own (in the case of many banks).38   
It has been commonly believed that the commercial and industrial publicly-traded 
companies in Victorian Britain may have been different from railways, banks and other 
sectors in that they had concentrated ownership, even well into the twentieth century.39  
Hannah has recently questioned this standard view by suggesting that London’s listing 
requirement of a two-thirds free float resulted in at least two-thirds of stock ending up in 
                                                 
36 Unfortunately, partial information and data was reported for some firms.  In particular, there were no 
voting rules reported for just over 100 companies. 
37 Cheffins, Corporate ownership and control, p.157. 
38 See Cheffins, Corporate ownership and control, pp.158-9 for railways and Acheson and Turner, 
‘Secondary market’, pp.142-5 for banks.  Several insurance companies also had such restrictions on 
ownership.  See Hannah, ‘Divorce of ownership’, pp.413-4. 
39 Chandler, Scale and scope, p.242; Cheffins, ‘History’, ‘Does law matter?’.   
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the hands of outside owners, which led to a separation of ownership from control.40  In 
response, Cheffins has argued that the two-thirds rule only applied to companies listed on 
the London market and was easily circumvented by others.41   Cheffins also notes that 
David Chadwick’s firm, which helped organise public offerings in the 1860s and 70s 
encouraged vendors to retain a sizeable stake in the floated company.42  From the 
perspective of the outside shareholder perspective, the structure of ownership may not 
necessarily matter.43  Although concentrated ownership may provide stronger incentives 
to monitor management and restrain the diversion of corporate resources, it may not be 
unambiguously good for outside shareholders as large owners can use their power to 
abuse minority interests.44  Nevertheless, in case ownership structure does matter, we 
analyse the two industries which had diffuse ownership (banks and railways) separately 
in our econometric work.  
Although we may not know much about ownership concentration, we do know 
that many companies had extensive shareholder constituencies.  For example, even by the 
mid-1850s, the average shareholder constituency for the ten largest railways was 7,700.45 
The 112 British banks reported in the 1880 Banking Almanac had on average 661.9 
shareholders, with 15 having more than 1,000 shareholders, and four having in excess of 
3,000 owners.46  Shareholder constituencies exceeding 1,000 were typical in the 
following sectors: docks, gas, water, telegraph and shipping.47   The insurance companies 
                                                 
40 Hannah, ‘Divorce of ownership’. 
41 Cheffins, Corporate ownership and control, pp.225-30. 
42 Cheffins, Corporate ownership and control, pp.169-70. 
43 Demsetz and Lehn, ‘Structure of corporate ownership’. 
44 Jensen and Meckling, ‘Theory of the firm’; Shleifer and Vishny, ‘Large shareholders’; La Porta et al. 
‘Corporate ownership’, p.474; McConnell and Servaes, “Additional evidence”.  
45 Cheffins, Corporate ownership and control, p.158. 
46 The median number of shareholders is 353, and the standard deviation is 827.  
47 Jefferys, Business organisation, pp.408-9. 
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in our sample, which were reported in a Parliamentary return in 1879, had on average 342 
shareholder, with three having 1,000 plus shareholders.48  From various issues of the 
Return of Joint Stock Companies, we were able to locate shareholder numbers for ninety 
of our sample companies, which had formed between 1878 and 1883.  The average 
number of shareholders is 371.6, with 23 companies having more than 500 
shareholders.49  The size of these shareholder constituencies indicates that even if 
companies did have large blockholders, there were many small outside shareholders 
investing in these companies who required assurance that they would receive a return on 
their investment.              
 
3.2 Locally-based shareholder constituency  
Berle and Means have suggested that in this era investors were able to protect themselves 
and hence did not need legal protection because    
“the corporation was small enough so that he could maintain direct contact with 
responsible individuals; and thus, either because of his individual influence, or his 
knowledge of the affairs of the corporation, and community sentiment in general, 
the law needed to worry little about him.”50 
 
On the other hand, they suggest that the size and geographical spread of large 
corporations raised the cost to shareholders of monitoring managers.51  Commenting on 
the Victorian situation, J. B. Jefferys suggests that 
 “the control exercised by the shareholders was mainly of a personal character, and  
                                                 
48 Return Relating to Joint Stock Banking and Other Companies, (P.P. 1879). 
49 The median number of shareholders is 337.5, and the standard deviation is 249.1.  Return of Joint Stock 
Companies, (P.P. 1878-1880, 1880-81, 1881, 1882).  As the Return of Joint Stock Companies simply 
reports on newly-formed companies, these shareholder numbers greatly underestimate the actual number of 
shareholders as not all shares were issued before the return was filed. 
50 Berle and Means, ‘Corporations’, p.56. 
51 Berle and Means, ‘Corporations’, p.58.  Even modern investors have a local bias – see Ivković and 
Weisbenner, “Local bias”. 
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the security of the investor lay in his knowledge of the men whom he had elected 
to the Board of Management and the financial and personal interest these latter 
had in the concern.”52   
 
Many nineteenth-century British companies originated as local concerns with local 
investors.53  However, as can be seen from Table 1, only 35 per cent of companies based 
outside London in 1883 had their headquarters in the same city as the chief market on 
which their stock was traded.54  As shareholder lists lengthened and as more firms 
conducted business in areas remote from their shareholder base, shareholders effectively 
handed control over to directors, and investment became impersonal.55  Nevertheless, 
some firms did continue to have their stocks traded on local exchanges, which may have 
resulted in better-informed shareholders than nationally-traded firms.56  Informal trust 
relationships in such companies may have acted as a partial substitute for formal investor 
protection.57  Consequently, we conjecture that the presence of informal trust 
mechanisms, which may be more prevalent if a company was traded locally, may have 
offered some protection to Victorian shareholders.   
The watchfulness exercised by shareholders was supposedly reinforced by 
uncalled capital, whereby shareholders were liable for more than  the amount they had 
paid-up in the company’s shares.  According to Jefferys, uncalled capital was firstly an 
“incentive to interest in the activities of the company”, and secondly, it made transferring 
shares extremely difficult, thus keeping the composition of shareholders and their interest 
                                                 
52 Jefferys, Business organisation, pp.409-10. 
53 Anderson and Cottrell, ‘Victorian capital market”; Broadbridge, ‘Railway share capital’; Newton, 
‘Towards financial integration’; Reed, ‘Railways’, Investment in railways. 
54 Given the size of London and the tendency of companies to locate there, companies with headquarters in 
London and shares traded on the London market are omitted from this measure.  365 companies had head 
offices in London and had their stock traded on the London market.  
55 Jefferys, Business organisation, p.386-7; 409. 
56 See Hannah, ‘Pioneering’, p.24. 
57 Other studies have emphasised the importance of such mechanisms in financial systems – see, for 
example, Lamoreaux, ‘Banks’; Franks et al, ‘Ownership’; Guiso et al, ‘Trusting’. 
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in the company stable.58  However, there is no correlation in the whole sample between 
the levels of uncalled capital and whether or not shares traded locally, suggesting that 
uncalled capital did not necessarily reinforce the desire for local control.59  
INSERT TABLE 1 
3.3 Shareholding voting rules 
Law and finance scholars suggest that one-share-one-vote rules better protect outside 
shareholders as under this system insiders cannot have substantial control without having 
substantial cash flow rights.60 However, an older tradition, recently highlighted by 
Dunlavy, argues that “democratic” voting mechanisms (i.e. one-shareholder-one-vote) 
may be more effective at constraining large insiders.61  She suggests that British 
corporations in the Victorian era sought to constrain the power of insiders by using 
graduated and capped voting scales.62  However, there are two potential problems with 
the view that voting rights matter for control that lead us to hypothesise that voting 
mechanisms were not an important means of protecting outside investors in Victorian 
Britain.  First, shareholder voice is only effective if shareholders can costlessly monitor 
managerial behaviour.  Second, shareholder voice suffers from a free-rider problem 
whereby investors under-invest in monitoring and in exercising their voice.  If investors 
don’t like the decisions of managers, a potentially less costly way of expressing their 
views or dissent is to exit by selling the company’s stock.63  This may explain the rapid 
                                                 
58 Jefferys, Business organisation, p.174. 
59 The correlation coefficient is 0.0369 and is not significant at the five per cent level. 
60 La Porta et al., ‘Law and finance’, pp.1126-7. 
61 Dunlavy, ‘Corporate Governance’. 
62 Dunlavy, ‘Corporate Governance’, p.30.  See Hilt, ‘Corporate Governance’ for evidence from the United 
States supporting this view. 
63 Easterbrook and Fischel, ‘Voting’, p.396. 
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decline in attendance at AGMs as well as the desire of Victorian investors for greater 
stock marketability.64   
  As BOI reports the voting rules and scales of each company, we can measure 
whether or not voting systems were weighted towards outside shareholders.65  
Admittedly, it is likely that most votes at general meetings were initially conducted by a 
show of hands to gauge whether or not a proposal had clear support.  However, if there 
was no clear majority and if the chairman or a group of shareholder demanded a poll, the 
voting schemes were applied.      
From Table 2 we can see that just less than a quarter of our sample had voting 
rights which placed a cap on the number of votes which any one shareholder could 
exercise, and graduated voting scales were employed by about 43 per cent of companies.  
On the other hand, about 48 per cent of companies had no caps on voting and didn’t have 
a graduated voting scheme.   
In Table 3 we see that older (and larger) firms were more likely to have voting 
rules which were weighted towards outside shareholders.  Although 431 of the companies 
in our voting-rights sample formed after 1862, only 67 (including 17 banks) of them had 
upper limits or caps on the number of votes any one shareholder could cast, whereas 91 
of the 262 firms formed before 1862 had voting caps.  This suggests that over time, 
company constitutions were increasingly less likely to weight voting schemes in favour 
of outside shareholders.  However, as discussed above, we do not believe that this 
ultimately mattered.  
INSERT TABLES 2 and 3 
                                                 
64 See Jefferys, Business organisation, pp.396, 409. 
65 Unfortunately the voting systems of some companies were not reported in BOI. 
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3.4 Boards of directors 
Boards of directors are usually viewed as endogenously determined institutions designed 
to ameliorate the ability of insiders to expropriate outside shareholders.66  They can also 
be viewed as delegated monitors of management who construct optimal managerial 
incentive contracts.67 Obviously, for boards to be credible, they need to have independent 
directors who act on behalf of shareholders by keeping executive directors in check.  One 
judge commenting on the rise of independent directors in Victorian Britain suggested that 
they reassured outside investors of the worth of the firm.68 However, during the Victorian 
era, there was a common perception that public companies often selected independent 
directors for their social position rather than their business experience – hence they were 
given the appellation ‘ornamental’ directors.69  Such directors were regarded “either too 
incompetent or too pre-occupied to become useful members of the board”, and were 
viewed as being “more frequently incumbrances than aids.”70 
 In order to get a measure of the prevalence of independent directors who were 
appointed because of their social position (the so-called ‘ornamental’ directors), we count 
the number of directors from the ruling class (i.e. MPs and aristocrats) on boards.  As can 
be seen from Table 4, the average number of ruling-class directors was 0.79, with an 
average of 9.57 per cent of board members coming from the ruling class.71  As we can 
see from Table 5, company age and the presence of ruling-class directors are positively 
correlated, suggesting that such directors were more prevalent in the established 
                                                 
66 Hermalin and Weisbach, ‘Boards of directors’, p.9. 
67 Hart, ‘Corporate governance’, p.681. 
68 Kennedy, Industrial structure, p.126. 
69 Chandler, Scale and scope, p.242. 
70 Chadwyck-Healey, Treatise, p.134. 
71 Of the 794 sample companies, 478 did not have a ruling-class director in 1883.   
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companies.  Notably, there is a negative correlation between the presence of ruling class 
directors and locally-traded stock, which could be evidence supporting the view that 
shareholders in locally-traded companies can more easily influence board structure so 
that ‘ornamental’ directors were not appointed.  Alternatively, such directors may have 
been appointed to non-regionally-based companies as a means of assuring investors.           
A mechanism which may align the interests of directors and shareholders is to 
require directors to own stock in the company before they take up their directorship.  In 
the Victorian era such a requirement was often included in a company’s constitution.72  
Indeed, Victorian investors were frequently given the advice to “watch your directors”, 
and this practically meant keeping a check on who the directors were, particularly the 
managing directors, and how much of the stock they owned.73   
Of the 791 companies for which we have board data, 654 placed share 
qualifications upon their directors.  As can be observed from Table 4, the average share 
qualification for a director and boards is 0.39 per cent and 2.53 per cent of a company’s 
par value respectively.74  As can be observed from Table 5, age and size are negatively 
correlated with the share qualifications of directors, suggesting that older and larger firms 
have lower share ownership qualifications.  However, it is more likely that director 
qualifications for older firms may simply have not kept pace with increases in capital.  As 
can be seen from Table 6, the size of qualifications varies substantially across industries.   
                                                 
72 Chadwyck-Healey, Treatise, p.134; Emden, Shareholders’ legal guide, p.8. 
73 Bartlett, Investors Directory, pp.74-5; Jefferys, Business organisation, pp.402-3.  Nevertheless, there was 
a general suspicion that some directors were given their qualifications without paying for them.  See S. C. 
Report on the Companies Acts of 1862 and 1867 (P.P. 1877), QQ. 697-708, 2481-84.  Such practices, if 
they occurred, would have weakened the alignment of interests between directors and shareholders. 
74 Campaigners for company law reform argued that the directors should be required to own a substantial 
amount of their company’s stock – anything from 10 to 20 per cent.  See S. C. Report on the Companies 
Acts of 1862 and 1867 (P.P. 1877), QQ. 1437-40; Jefferys, Business organisation, p.430. 
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Although directorial ownership qualifications may have been small relative to the 
size of the company, they would still have represented a substantial proportion of a 
director’s personal wealth.  The median director in our sample had to hold at least £1,000 
(at market value) of their company’s stock in 1883.75  Given Lindert’s and Rubenstein’s 
wealth estimates of the titled and mercantile classes for this period, this stake would have 
a substantial proportion of an individual director’s wealth, thus incentivising them to 
ensure that their company was well run.76   We therefore hypothesize that directorial 
qualifications played a positive role in protecting outside shareholders. 
INSERT TABLES 4, 5 & 6 
 Founders or deferred shares were shares held by directors (who were usually the 
founders of the company) which received no dividend until a pre-established dividend 
had been paid to ordinary shareholders, and sometimes they gave the holders a right to a 
high share of profits once the pre-established dividend had been met.77  Only 14 of our 
sample companies had such shares, and all but one of these were under three years of 
age.78  Given the highly incentivised nature of these shares, we hypothesise that they 
played some role in protecting shareholders.    
The size of the board may also have been a factor in its effectiveness. As can be 
seen from Table 4, the average size of boards in 1883 was 7.55.  Unsurprisingly, as we 
can see in Table 5, the size of boards is positively correlated with size and age, a finding 
that is reiterated in Table 6.  A Victorian company law expert suggested that “it is not 
                                                 
75 The average was £2,097.  In terms of par value, the median director held £500. 
76 Lindert, ‘Unequal English wealth’, p.1137 estimates that the average titled and mercantile man had 
estates in 1875 of approximately £9,800 and £11,804 respectively.  Rubenstein, ‘Victorian middle classes’ 
suggests that prior to 1879, very few men had estates valued at more than £250,000   
77 Thanks to a referee for bringing these shares to our attention. 
78 We found 17 additional companies in the Commercial and Industrial section of BOI which had such 
shares, but these young companies are not in our sample as they were not reported in the IMM. 
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generally desirable to have a large board”79, possibly because large boards could result in 
director free-riding, with boards simply becoming window dressing.80  However, large 
boards of directors can also be viewed as a commitment device to investors as multiple 
directors can partially constrain executive directors by making collusion amongst them 
more costly.  Directors can also engage in mutual monitoring of one another.81  More 
importantly, however, given the existence of directorial share qualifications, larger 
boards imply that there are more individuals with substantial proportions of their wealth 
dependent upon their company’s performance.  We therefore hypothesize that larger 
boards may have provided better protection for investors. 
INSERT TABLE 6 
3.5 Dividends  
Dividends potentially played an important signalling role for investors in an era with little 
publicly-available information on companies.82  As such, dividends were intrinsic to the 
valuation of shares, and if investors were unhappy with dividend payouts, share prices 
would be adjusted downwards to reflect this.83 Consequently, one would also expect 
investors to favour stable dividends, resulting in companies smoothing profits over the 
business cycle.  Given that directors were typically required to own company stock and, 
as was established above, these stakes were a sizeable proportion of the median director’s 
asset portfolio, directors would have had a large incentive to ensure that their company 
paid high and stable dividends.  The payment of high dividends implies that cash flows 
                                                 
79 Chadwyck-Healey, Treatise, p.134.  
80 See Yermack, ‘Higher market’ for modern-day evidence which supports this view.  However, a recent 
study by Coles et al, ‘Boards’ suggests that large boards are not necessarily a bad thing. 
81 Hermalin and Weisbach, ‘Boards of directors’, p.10. 
82 Baskin and Miranti, History of corporate finance, p.19; Cheffins, Corporate ownership and control, 
pp.108-15. 
83 Cheffins, Corporate ownership and control, p.112. 
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can’t be diverted by insiders for personal use or invested in negative net-present-value 
projects which benefit insiders.84  In addition, by paying dividends, managers may have 
to go more frequently to the capital markets to raise funds, and are therefore subject to 
the discipline of the market if it is discovered that they have engaged in opportunism.85       
Dividends can thus be viewed as a substitute for legal protection.86  In other 
words, if outside investors aren’t adequately protected by the legal system, insiders will 
pay higher dividends to maintain their reputation with investors and the capital market.  
We calculate two dividend measures for our sample.  First, we use the dividend / par ratio 
which is reported in the IMM – this measures the level of dividend paid out as a 
percentage of a stock’s paid-up value.  We obtained the dividend / par ratio for 1883 and 
for every year in the previous decade or for as long as the company had been in existence 
if it was less than 10 years old.87  Second, we use a variable which calculates the 
percentage of distributable profits paid out as a dividend. However, due to data 
availability, we were only able to calculate this measure for 424 companies in 1883.  
  From Table 7, we observe that the dividend / par ratio was relatively high and 
that the coefficient of variation of the dividend / par ratio was low for most industries, 
suggesting that investors had a preference for high and stable dividends.  Indeed, in this 
era the dividend paid was the chief concern of shareholders, and remained so well into 
the twentieth century.88  The average and median dividend payout ratio for the overall 
                                                 
84 Jensen, ‘Agency cost’; Faccio et al., ‘Dividends’. 
85 Easterbrook, ‘Two agency cost’. 
86 Cheffins, ‘Dividends as a substitute’. See La Porta et al, ‘Agency problems’ who argue that dividends are 
an outcome of good investor protection rather than a substitute for it.  
87 The 1884 edition of the IMM was checked in case dividends paid in 1883 were reported in 1884 instead 
of 1883. 
88 Jefferys, Business organisation, p.409; Cheffins, ‘History’, p.100. 
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sample are high, suggesting that companies typically did not have much free cash flow.89  
Notably, the dividend payout ratio is highest for banks and railways, two of the largest 
and longest-established sectors on the equity market.  
INSERT TABLE 7 
As can be seen from Table 7, in terms of dividend / par ratio, the financial sector 
has the highest ratio, which could be explained by the fact that such institutions may not 
have needed to retain earnings due to the nature of their business.  Alternatively, as the 
opaque nature of assets in this sector may have increased the ability of managers to 
engage in opportunism, high dividend payments could be viewed as a commitment 
mechanism to outside shareholders. 
The regression results in Table 8 indicate that larger firms had a higher dividend 
payout ratio, which is unsurprising as such companies are more likely to be mature 
entities with large cash flows and few investment opportunities.  Interestingly, our growth 
variable suggests that a firm’s investment opportunities don’t appear to have affected its 
dividend payout decision.  The coefficient on the age variable supports this finding in that 
company age doesn’t appear to affect the dividend payout ratio.       
INSERT TABLE 8 
 
 
4. Corporate governance, dividends, and corporate value 
 
The key question for us is whether any of the above hypothesised means of protecting 
outside investors were effective.  One possibility would be to see whether or not these 
various mechanisms matter for firm market values.  The usual method of measuring firm 
                                                 
89 Hart, Studies in profit, I, p.121 finds that the mean ratio of dividends and interest to total income for 
British manufacturing companies in the period 1920-38 is similar to the payout ratio found in the present 
study. 
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market values in corporate-governance studies is to use Tobin’s Q.90  The general idea 
behind using Tobin’s Q in these studies is that it provides some indication as to whether 
managers are acting in the best interests of outside shareholders.91 Tobin’s Q relates the 
market value of a firm, which is the expected sum of discounted cash flows that investors 
expect to receive, to the replacement value of assets. These expected cash flows will be 
determined by the future performance of the company and the rate of managerial 
expropriation.  We use the growth variable in our regressions to control for the potential 
investment opportunities component of Tobin’s Q.  Due to data availability, Tobin’s Q is 
available for just over one half of our sample.          
Studies of the effect of corporate governance on corporate value typically face 
two methodological issues.  The first issue is that variables could have been omitted from 
the regression, and these omitted variables could explain the observed correlations.  The 
usual way of dealing with omitted variable bias is to use panel regression with firm fixed 
or random effects.  However, our governance variables change slowly, if they even 
change at all.  Furthermore, as noted above, dividend policy was also unlikely to change 
in the short-run, thus panel estimation techniques are of little value in this context.  The 
second issue is that endogeneity can be a problem in such studies – do firms with high 
market values choose certain governance mechanisms or do certain governance 
mechanisms cause higher market values?  Endogeneity may not be a major problem for 
us for at least two reasons.  First, many of our governance variables are decided upon 
before a firm is actually launched unto the public market.  Second, we deal with the 
                                                 
90 See, for example, Demsetz and Lehn, ‘Structure of corporate ownership’; Morck et al, ‘Management 
ownership’; McConnell and Servaes, ‘Additional evidence’; Demsetz and Villalonga, ‘Ownership 
structure’; Gompers et al, ‘Corporate governance’; Villalonga and Amit, ‘Family ownership’. 
91 Two firms with the same potential cashflow may have a different Tobin’s Q if the perceived risk of 
expropriation is different. Ceteris paribus, the lower the rate of expropriation the higher the Tobin’s Q. 
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possibility that high market value may cause firms to pay a higher dividend, by looking at 
dividend policy in the long-run.  In other words, it is highly unlikely that a firm’s Tobin’s 
Q in 1883 causes a firm’s dividend policy in the previous decade. However, the absence 
of an appropriate instrumental variable implies that our estimates should be considered as 
correlations rather than casual effects.      
We exclude all outliers from our sample because (a) historical financial and 
accounting data was prone to typographical errors, (b) accounting data wasn’t bounded 
by standardized accounting conventions, and (c) equity values might be imperfect metrics 
of firm value due to the absence of publicly-available information on companies.  For 
example, in the case of Tobin’s Q, we exclude all companies with a Q greater than three. 
Our empirical strategy is to test whether or not dividends and governance 
variables are correlated with corporate value.  We also include some control variables in 
our regressions such as company age and size, industry binary variables, market power, 
uncalled capital, profit, and firm growth.92  There are two caveats which must be placed 
on the latter two control variables. Firstly, they are based on accounting data, which, as 
already stated, was not governed by standardized conventions.  Secondly, they are not 
available for all companies, and when they are both included along with governance and 
other control variables, they greatly reduce the number of observations in our regressions.  
Consequently, we run our regressions with and without these two control variables.         
We have two different measures of dividends – the dividend / par ratio and the 
dividend payout ratio.  Two versions of the dividend / par ratio are used, both of which 
are trying to capture dividend behaviour in the long-run – one which uses the average of 
                                                 
92 We ignore the ‘reserve liability’ which many banks adopted after their conversion from unlimited 
liability in the early 1880s because it was only callable in the event of bankruptcy, whereas uncalled capital 
could be called up at any time at the discretion of the directors.  
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the ratio from 1880 to 1882 and one which uses the average of the ratio from 1873 to 
1882.  As the dividend payout ratio for banks and railways is available for dates earlier 
than 1883, we create a variable for these two sectors which is the average of the dividend 
payout ratio in 1873 and 1883.   We also attempt to capture whether dividend stability 
was something which was valued by outside investors using the coefficient of variation 
of a company’s dividend / par ratio over the previous decade. 
INSERT TABLES 9, 10, 11 and 12 
As can be seen in Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12, in terms of the governance variables, 
the board size variable is consistently positive across all and statistically significant 
across most of the specifications, suggesting that larger boards (scaled for firm size) had 
a positive impact on corporate value.  The coefficient on the directors qualification 
variable is mostly significant and always positive in the specifications in Tables 9, 10, 11 
and 12, suggesting that the greater the required share ownership of the board, the higher 
will be the corporate value.  The coefficient on the ruling class directors variable is 
consistently negative in all the specifications, but it isn’t always statistically significant.  
This evidence suggests that the presence of these so-called ‘ornamental’ directors had a 
negative influence on corporate value.93  The coefficient on the founders variable in 
Table 9 suggests that the presence of founders or deferred shares has a positive impact on 
                                                 
93 Braggion, ‘Credit market constraints’, finds that the presence of titled directors on the boards of new-
technology manufacturing companies had a positive impact on firm growth.  His basic argument is that 
having titled directors on the boards of new technology companies provides such companies with a greater 
access to informal credit.  An alternative interpretation is the titled classes were simply diversifying their 
wealth due to the steep fall in land prices and redistributive legislative interference in landowner / tenant 
contracts (Thompson, English landed society, p.307; Atiyah, Rise and fall, p.585).  Interestingly, when 
Braggion looks at established companies as well as the new technology companies, he finds that titled 
directors have a negative (although not a statistically significant) impact on firm growth.   
 25 
corporate value, but once we control for firm growth, the coefficient is no longer 
statistically significant.94     
As hypothesized, the coefficient on the cap on votes variable is never significant, 
suggesting that voting arrangements which were weighted towards outside shareholders 
provided little protection.95  Although not reported in Tables 9-12, we also used a binary 
variable which equals 1 if the company voting scheme was one-share-one-vote, 0 
otherwise.  One could view this variable as a proxy for the probability of a takeover as 
such voting schemes facilitated takeovers.96  However, we also found this variable to be 
insignificant, suggesting that the increased potential of a takeover bid did not appear to 
protect shareholders.         
Specifications 10 and 11 in Table 9 include a market power variable, which 
attempts to capture the absence of product market competition on corporate value.  
Although only statistically significant in the smaller sample, the coefficient is negative on 
both occasions, which suggests that the product market competition may have played 
some role in protecting outside investors from expropriation.         
All our various dividend variables in Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12 are positively 
correlated with corporate value apart from specifications 9, 11 and 13 in Table 9. Of 
particular note is that the coefficients on the dividend payout ratio in Tables 9 and 10 are 
positive, large and statistically significant, suggesting that firms which pay out substantial 
                                                 
94 The founders variable is not in Tables 11 and 12 because none of the companies had three or more years 
of dividend payments.  
95 An alternative binary variable, which was 1 if companies either had a cap on votes and/or graduated 
voting scales, 0 otherwise, was used in the regression specifications.  This variable was also statistically 
insignificant. 
96 Hannah, ‘Divorce of ownership’, pp.409-10. 
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proportions of their earnings have higher corporate values.97  In addition, the sign on the 
dividend coef. of var.  variable is consistently negative and mostly statistically significant 
across the various specifications, suggesting that a stable dividend payout policy has a 
positive impact on corporate value.  Taking these findings together, it would appear that 
investors  rewarded the payment of high and stable dividends with higher market values, 
implying they were an important mechanism by which investors assured themselves of a 
return on their investment. 
 The coefficient on the traded locally variable is positive in most specifications but 
is statistically significant in about half of the specifications.  This evidence suggests that 
informal trust mechanisms may have provided some protection to shareholders.  In order 
to see if the marginal impact of board size or the dividend variables varies with traded 
locally, our proxy for informal trust mechanisms, we add interaction terms to our 
regression specifications in Tables 9, 11 and 12.  The coefficients on the dividend 
interaction terms suggest that the marginal impact of dividends on corporate performance 
does not differ much between locally-traded and nationally-traded companies.  On the 
other hand, the coefficient on the board size / traded locally interaction term suggests that 
an increase in board size has a greater marginal impact on corporate performance for 
locally-traded companies than nationally-traded ones.  This finding may arise because in 
companies where informal trust mechanisms were important, the more directors which 
                                                 
97 Although not reported in the tables, whenever we interact our industry dummies with the dividend payout 
ratio variable, we find that the marginal impact on corporate performance of an increase in the dividend 
payout ratio is smaller for railways, telegraph companies, and land and building companies.  When the 
industry dummies are interacted with board size, we find that the marginal impact on corporate 
performance of an increase in board size is smaller for insurance companies, land mortgage and finance 
companies, and tea and coffee companies.   
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were in place, the greater the number of individuals with which shareholders were 
acquainted.   
The above raises the interesting question as to how dividends protected outside 
shareholders. As share prices in this financial market were largely driven by dividends (in 
the absence of other publicly-available data) and as directorial share qualifications meant 
that the median director had a significant proportion of their asset portfolio invested in 
their company’s stock, then it was in the interest of directors to ensure that high dividends 
were maintained.  This would have acted as a check on substantial surreptitious (or 
otherwise) expropriation by directors.   
An alternative explanation as to why dividends protected investors is that paying 
dividends may have meant that managers had to go more frequently to the capital markets 
to raise funds, thereby subjecting themselves to the scrutiny and discipline of the 
market.98  We are able to test this alternative explanation by regressing dividends (1883) 
(dividend par ratio in 1883) and dividend payout ratio on the change in total paid-up 
value of all securities (ordinary and preference shares as well as debentures) issued over 
the subsequent decade, which was captured by the variable new security issue.  As can be 
seen from Table 13, the coefficient on the dividend payout ratio variable is not 
statistically significant, but the coefficient on the dividends (1883) variable is statistically 
significant, although it is small, as is the explanatory power of this variable.  Taken as a 
whole, this would suggest that there is little evidence to support the idea that firms were 
submitting themselves to market discipline by having a high dividend payout. 
INSERT TABLE 13 
 
                                                 
98 Easterbrook, ‘Two agency cost’. 
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5. Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that in a laissez-faire legal environment, 
dividends played an important role in assuring outside shareholders of a return on their 
investment.  Our results also suggest that large boards (relative to firm size) and 
requirements upon directors to own shares are positively correlated with Tobin’s Q.  On 
the other hand, the presence of independent directors from the ruling class, the so-called 
‘ornamental’ directors, are negatively correlated with corporate value.  Informal trust 
mechanisms also may have played a role in protecting investors in companies which 
issued their stock on local stock exchanges.  Notably, voting mechanisms which were 
weighted towards outside shareholders do not appear to have been valued by them.   
The main implication of our findings for the Victorian capital-market failure 
debate is that high and stable dividend payments and well-structured and incentivised 
boards may have acted as an effective market substitute for legal protection.  In terms of 
the recent ‘law and finance’ debate, our findings suggest that dividend payments may 
well have been a partial substitute for weak investor protection laws in nascent financial 
markets.              
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Table 1.  Companies with stock traded locally (1883) 
Industry N 
Company stock traded on market 
in same city in which it is 
headquartered 
(excluding London) 
 
% 
Company stock traded on market 
in same city in which it is 
headquartered 
 (including London) 
 
% 
Steamships & Shipbuilding 39 56.41 92.31 
Wagon & Railway Carriage 19 52.63 52.63 
Spinning & Weaving 8 50.00 50.00 
Canals 17 47.06 58.82 
Iron, Coal & Steel 44 43.18 56.82 
Banks 157 40.13 73.89 
Industrial & Commercial 123 39.02 81.30 
Land Mortgage & Financial 52 38.46 96.15 
Insurance 103 33.98 93.20 
Railways 57 33.33 68.42 
Land & Building 32 28.13 87.50 
Tramway & Omnibus 39 25.64 89.74 
Docks 9 22.22 77.78 
Gas & Waterworks 67 20.90 71.64 
Mines 19 15.79 47.37 
Tea & Coffee 17 5.88 100.00 
Telegraph 21 4.76 95.24 
    
Total 823 34.99 78.98 
Source: see text. 
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Table 2.  Shareholder voting rights (1883) 
Industry N 
 
 
 
(%) 
One Vote per 
Share 
 
 
(%) 
One Vote per 
Multiple 
Shares 
 
(%) 
Graduated 
Voting 
 
 
(%) 
Cap on votes 
 
 
 
(%) 
Graduated 
Voting or Cap 
on votes 
 
(%) 
Banks 139 15.83 25.18 58.99 44.60 64.75 
Spinning & Weaving 7 85.71 0.00 14.29 42.86 42.86 
Insurance 85 24.71 27.06 48.24 36.47 63.53 
Canals 11 45.45 45.45 9.09 36.36 45.45 
Docks 9 22.22 11.11 66.67 33.33 77.78 
Gas & Waterworks 53 41.51 15.09 43.40 24.53 52.83 
Land Mortgage & Financial 48 56.25 22.92 20.83 20.83 37.50 
Land & Building 29 65.52 13.79 20.69 20.69 34.48 
Tea & Coffee 14 7.14 64.29 28.57 14.29 42.86 
Wagon & Railway Carriage 14 14.29 21.43 64.29 14.29 28.57 
Telegraph 21 47.62 38.10 14.29 14.29 71.43 
Steamships & Shipbuilding 36 38.89 30.56 30.56 13.89 36.11 
Tramway & Omnibus 37 51.35 18.92 29.73 10.81 37.84 
Industrial & Commercial 109 45.87 21.10 33.03 9.17 39.45 
Iron, Coal & Steel 40 47.50 17.50 35.00 7.50 40.00 
Railways 53 9.43 1.89 88.68 3.77 90.57 
Mines 11 45.45 27.27 27.27 0.00 27.27 
       
Total 716 34.78 22.21 43.02 22.77 52.23 
Source: see text.   
Notes: An example of a voting scale which was one vote per multiple shares is as follows: 5 shares = 1 vote; 10 shares 
= 2 votes; 15 shares = 3 votes etc.. By graduated voting schemes, we mean voting scales such as the following 5-10 
shares = 1 vote; 10-25 = 2 votes; 25-50 shares = 3 votes; 50-100 shares = 4 votes etc..  A cap on votes simply means 
that there is a limit on the number of votes no matter how much stock a person owns.  For example, the Wilts and 
Dorset Bank placed a cap on votes of 5.  In other words, no shareholder was entitled to more than 5 votes even if they 
owned 90 per cent of the stock. 
 
 
Table 3.  Shareholder voting rights and firm characteristics: correlation coefficients  
 One Vote per Share 
One Vote per 
Multiple Shares 
Graduated 
Voting 
Cap on votes 
 
Graduated Voting 
or Cap on votes 
Age -0.227* 0.056 0.170* 0.219* 0.173* 
Size -0.143* 0.003 0.135* 0.213* 0.169* 
Uncalled capital -0.159* 0.001 0.156* 0.256* 0.167* 
Traded Locally -0.032 0.028 0.008 0.074 0.056 
 Notes: * Significant at 5% level. 
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Table 4.  Boards of directors (1883) 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Max Min N 
No. of Directors 7.55 4.21 44.00 2.00 795 
No. of Directors / Total Par Value (£000s) 0.08 0.18 3.65 0.00 780 
Ruling Class Directors 0.79 1.31 9.00 0.00 794 
Ruling Class Directors / No. of Directors (%) 9.47 15.21 100.00 0.00 794 
Individual Directors' Qualification £687 £949 £12,500 £0 791 
Individual Directors' Qualification / Total Par Value (%.) 0.39 0.63 6.67 0.00 779 
Total Directors' Qualification £5,307 £8,416 £100,000 £0 788 
Total Directors' Qualification / Total Par Value (%) 2.53 3.96 50.00 0.00 776 
Source: see text. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Boards of directors and firm characteristics: correlation coefficients 
 
No. of Directors No. of Ruling Class 
Directors 
Ruling Class 
Directors / No. of 
Directors (%) 
Individual Directors' 
Qualification / Total 
Par Value (%) 
Total Directors' 
Qualification / Total 
Par Value (%) 
Age 0.360* 0.148* -0.014 -0.119* -0.051 
Size 0.432* 0.349* 0.196* -0.231* -0.165* 
Traded Locally -0.013 -0.254* -0.271* 0.027 0.029 
Notes: * Significant at 5% level. 
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Table 6. Boards of directors: industry averages (1883) 
 No. of 
Directors 
No. 
Directors / 
Total Par 
Value 
(£’000s) 
 
No. of 
Ruling Class 
Directors 
No. Ruling 
Class / No. 
of Directors 
 
 
(%) 
Individual 
Directors’ 
Qualifications 
/ Total Par 
Value 
(%) 
Total Directors’ 
Qualification / 
Total Par Value 
 
 
(%) 
N1 
Banks 7.63 0.04 0.63 7.00 0.41 2.57 157 
Canals 8.67 0.05 0.56 5.27 0.24 1.78 9 
Docks 16.44 0.02 1.67 15.47 0.19 1.73 9 
Gas & Waterworks 7.48 0.06 0.44 5.30 0.33 2.36 64 
Industrial & Commercial 5.61 0.07 0.30 5.00 0.46 2.61 122 
Insurance 12.55 0.19 1.53 11.00 0.36 3.82 100 
Iron, Coal & Steel 5.80 0.03 0.30 4.80 0.57 3.10 44 
Land & Building 6.32 0.08 0.87 12.52 0.47 2.51 31 
Land Mortgage & Financial 6.18 0.10 1.24 19.69 0.39 2.04 51 
Mines 5.33 0.43 0.33 6.94 0.47 2.06 12 
Railways 9.40 0.02 1.86 19.21 0.16 1.20 57 
Spinning & Weaving 6.38 0.08 0.13 6.25 0.47 2.75 8 
Steamships & Shipbuilding 6.86 0.06 0.36 5.55 0.72 4.35 36 
Tea & Coffee 4.65 0.05 0.18 3.92 0.55 2.66 17 
Telegraph 6.85 0.03 2.30 33.13 0.16 1.12 20 
Tramway & Omnibus 4.64 0.04 0.36 10.07 0.19 0.87 39 
Wagon & Railway Carriage 5.37 0.10 0.16 2.68 0.36 1.83 19 
Source: see text. 
Notes: 1 In a small number of cases, missing information means that N is slightly less than the reported figure. 
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Table 7. Company dividends: industry averages 
Industry 
Dividend / Par (%) in 1883 Average Dividend / Par (%) for 
1880-82 
Average Dividend / Par (%) for 
1873-82 
Coefficient of Variation 
of Dividend / Par (%) 
1873-1882 
Dividend Payout Ratio (%) 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
Banks 157 11.6 11.0 141 10.9 10.0 115 12.3 11.7 22.7 126 88.4 93.0 
Canals 17 5.7 4.5 15 5.5 4.5 11 6.0 4.8 15.5 . . . 
Docks 9 4.1 4.3 6 4.6 4.1 6 4.3 4.3 28.4 . . . 
Gas & Waterworks 67 7.8 9.0 51 8.2 8.0 28 7.8 8.0 24.2 22 69.7 61.8 
Industrial & Commercial 113 6.1 5.0 63 6.5 6.0 27 7.5 7.1 62.1 72 68.8 68.7 
Insurance 93 10.9 7.5 67 13.0 10.8 54 12.2 10.9 33.7 61 62.9 39.6 
Iron, Coal & Steel 44 3.9 1.9 27 3.8 3.7 11 4.8 5.5 102.3 . . . 
Land & Building 27 7.4 5.0 9 5.7 5.0 4 3.7 3.9 70.0 13 69.8 88.4 
Land Mortgage & Financial 49 8.6 8.0 28 10.1 9.7 0 . . 35.8 37 70.8 73.1 
Mines 18 0.9 0.0 8 0.0 0.0 3 0.0 0.0 236.6 . . . 
Railways 56 2.9 3.4 27 2.6 2.1 19 3.0 2.6 52.7 33 96.6 99.9 
Spinning & Weaving 8 9.2 9.8 2 10.4 10.4 0 . . 58.1 . . . 
Steamships & Shipbuilding 36 5.5 6.0 24 5.4 6.0 14 6.1 6.2 56.1 19 64.9 69.6 
Tea & Coffee 16 2.5 0.0 13 2.6 0.7 5 3.3 2.9 87.3 9 44.7 0.0 
Telegraph 19 4.9 5.0 12 5.3 4.5 5 7.7 5.3 46.0 12 77.5 85.7 
Tramway & Omnibus 38 4.2 4.4 25 5.1 5.3 5 6.9 7.8 49.7 20 46.5 52.7 
Wagon & Railway Carriage 19 4.5 5.0 15 4.0 4.7 6 7.8 7.6 63.2 . . . 
              
Total 786 7.4 6.0 533 8.0 6.9 313 9.4 8.1 43.9 424 74.7 84.2 
Source: see text. 
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Table 8. Dividend payout ratio regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Growth -0.070 -0.053 -0.057 -0.047   
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.053) (0.054)   
Age   0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size   0.111*** 0.095*** 0.119*** 0.099*** 
   (0.021) (0.026) (0.015) (0.018) 
Industry Dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Constant 0.732*** 0.714*** -0.666*** -0.769*** -0.771*** -0.462** 
 (0.036) (0.148) (0.247) (0.289) (0.187) (0.229) 
       
Observations 212 212 186 186 375 375 
R2 0.010 0.081 0.161 0.197 0.182 0.208 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 per cent level; *** significant at 1 per 
cent level. 
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Table 9.  Corporate value regressions using dividend payout ratio (all industries in 1883)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
              
Dividend Payout Ratio   0.184*** 0.117** 0.045 0.192*** 0.082** 0.100 -0.025 0.092* -0.011 0.107* -0.012 
   (0.054) (0.046) (0.052) (0.055) (0.040) (0.070) (0.054) (0.049) (0.055) (0.056) (0.054) 
Dividend coef. of var     -0.312***  -0.089**  -0.130***  -0.133***  -0.132*** 
     (0.041)  (0.035)  (0.047)  (0.042)  (0.047) 
Profit      0.016 -0.040  -0.127  -0.059  -0.078 
      (0.012) (0.091)  (0.099)  (0.095)  (0.084) 
Growth        0.006 0.004  0.021  0.009 
        (0.026) (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Age 0.000 -0.000  -0.000   -0.000  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size 0.186*** 0.190***  0.174***   0.151***  0.224*** 0.175*** 0.214*** 0.175*** 0.222*** 
 (0.014) (0.016)  (0.018)   (0.017)  (0.031) (0.018) (0.029) (0.018) (0.029) 
Traded Locally 0.079*** 0.084***  0.074***   0.055**  0.040 0.070*** 0.042 0.026 -0.061 
 (0.026) (0.026)  (0.026)   (0.025)  (0.053) (0.026) (0.055) (0.082) (0.098) 
Traded Locally*Dividend Payout Ratio            0.031 0.015 
            (0.090) (0.111) 
Traded Locally*Board size            0.424 1.077* 
            (0.595) (0.642) 
Board Size 1.840*** 1.496***  1.385***   1.166***  1.404*** 1.802*** 1.572*** 1.221*** 0.895*** 
 (0.343) (0.351)  (0.353)   (0.362)  (0.475) (0.348) (0.494) (0.352) (0.330) 
Ruling Class Directors -0.102 -0.142  -0.199**   -0.272***  -0.275** -0.131 -0.268** -0.189** -0.279** 
 (0.082) (0.088)  (0.094)   (0.087)  (0.126) (0.090) (0.116) (0.095) (0.126) 
Directorial Qualifications 6.955*** 8.636***  7.709***   7.441***  16.590*** 5.623*** 13.089** 7.859*** 17.118*** 
 (1.604) (1.775)  (1.680)   (1.963)  (5.768) (1.390) (5.143) (1.696) (5.901) 
Uncalled Capital -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.002***   -0.002***  -0.002* -0.002** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cap on Votes -0.021 -0.022  -0.024   -0.013  0.005 -0.025 0.041 -0.028 -0.001 
 (0.025) (0.023)  (0.024)   (0.022)  (0.051) (0.027) (0.057) (0.025) (0.052) 
Market Power          -0.047 -0.119**   
          (0.043) (0.059)   
Founders 0.056 0.077**  0.070*   0.057  0.027 0.034 0.046 0.076* 0.011 
 (0.036) (0.036)  (0.037)   (0.052)  (0.086) (0.028) (0.054) (0.041) (0.090) 
Constant -1.392*** -1.451*** 0.883*** -1.313*** 1.106*** 0.875*** -0.956*** 0.922*** -1.754*** -1.300*** -1.563*** -1.314*** -1.688*** 
 (0.180) (0.214) (0.042) (0.217) (0.044) (0.043) (0.213) (0.056) (0.377) (0.209) (0.341) (0.215) (0.367) 
              
Industry Dummies NO YES NO YES NO NO YES NO YES NO NO YES YES 
              
Observations 336 336 418 310 358 417 274 212 124 310 124 310 124 
R-squared 0.477 0.525 0.055 0.534 0.183 0.059 0.596 0.014 0.663 0.479 0.621 0.537 0.677 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 per cent level; *** significant at 1 per cent level. 
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Table 10. Corporate value regressions using dividend payout ratio (banks and railways 
in 1883)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Dividend Payout Ratio   0.302*** 0.198***   
   (0.082) (0.069)   
Average Payout Ratio (1873 & 83)     0.507*** 0.279** 
     (0.114) (0.117) 
Dividend coef. of var    -0.013  -0.030 
    (0.040)  (0.047) 
Age -0.000 -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size 0.106*** 0.104***  0.089***  0.090*** 
 (0.012) (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
Traded Locally 0.043* 0.041**  0.021  0.026 
 (0.022) (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.030) 
Board Size 1.813*** 1.769***  1.439***  1.926 
 (0.669) (0.581)  (0.518)  (1.296) 
Ruling Class Directors -0.215*** -0.119  -0.150  -0.144 
 (0.076) (0.090)  (0.095)  (0.117) 
Directorial Qualifications 2.450 1.100  0.758  0.315 
 (1.811) (1.378)  (1.106)  (1.234) 
Cap on Votes 0.003 -0.031*  -0.031*  -0.039* 
 (0.020) (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.022) 
Railways  -0.111***  -0.082  -0.058 
  (0.037)  (0.069)  (0.075) 
Constant -0.381** -0.308** 0.815*** -0.263 0.677*** -0.333 
 (0.174) (0.144) (0.070) (0.178) (0.095) (0.226) 
       
Observations 152 152 149 109 101 76 
R-squared 0.507 0.563 0.055 0.478 0.178 0.520 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 per cent level; *** significant at 1 per 
cent level. 
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Table 11.  Corporate value regressions using average dividend / par ratio (1880-82)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
Dividends (1880-1882)   0.027*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.015*** 0.038*** 0.016* 0.020*** 0.023*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) 
Dividend coef. of var     -0.200***  -0.081  -0.110  -0.098 
     (0.055)  (0.052)  (0.071)  (0.071) 
Profit      0.001 -0.124**  -0.137  -0.105 
      (0.002) (0.058)  (0.083)  (0.073) 
Growth        0.088** 0.025  0.032* 
        (0.042) (0.019)  (0.018) 
Age 0.000 -0.000  -0.000   0.000  -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size 0.186*** 0.190***  0.134***   0.123***  0.181*** 0.130*** 0.174*** 
 (0.014) (0.017)  (0.019)   (0.019)  (0.036) (0.019) (0.036) 
Traded Locally 0.078*** 0.083***  0.050**   0.036  0.044 0.097 0.067 
 (0.026) (0.025)  (0.025)   (0.026)  (0.059) (0.062) (0.109) 
Traded Locally*Dividends (1880-82)          -0.009* -0.013 
          (0.005) (0.008) 
Traded Locally*Board size          0.681 1.189* 
          (0.519) (0.668) 
Board Size 1.843*** 1.502***  1.033***   1.049***  1.229*** 0.798*** 0.667* 
 (0.343) (0.351)  (0.303)   (0.298)  (0.432) (0.288) (0.340) 
Ruling Class Directors -0.102 -0.140  -0.153   -0.205*  -0.254 -0.101 -0.185 
 (0.082) (0.088)  (0.120)   (0.121)  (0.180) (0.124) (0.173) 
Directorial Qualifications 6.931*** 8.591***  7.544***   7.185***  14.734* 7.727*** 17.376** 
 (1.598) (1.766)  (1.990)   (2.084)  (8.156) (2.153) (7.682) 
Uncalled Capital -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.002***   -0.002***  -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cap on Votes -0.020 -0.021  -0.001   -0.004  0.018 -0.005 0.033 
 (0.025) (0.023)  (0.022)   (0.022)  (0.056) (0.022) (0.058) 
Constant -1.391*** -1.449*** 0.801*** -0.841*** 0.943*** 0.806*** -0.639*** 0.689*** -1.314*** -0.828*** -1.244*** 
 (0.180) (0.214) (0.035) (0.236) (0.047) (0.037) (0.236) (0.048) (0.419) (0.234) (0.421) 
            
Industry Dummies NO YES NO YES NO NO YES NO YES YES YES 
            
Observations 336 336 333 256 325 301 231 150 102 256 102 
R-squared 0.476 0.525 0.283 0.614 0.306 0.278 0.618 0.367 0.679 0.627 0.705 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 per cent level; *** significant at 1 per cent level. 
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Table 12.  Corporate value regressions using average dividend / par ratio (1873-82)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
Dividends (1873-1882)   0.025*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.034*** 0.024 0.018*** 0.039*** 
   (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.016) (0.004) (0.013) 
Dividend coef. of var     -0.206***  -0.087  -0.297  -0.263 
     (0.070)  (0.090)  (0.175)  (0.179) 
Profit      0.000 -0.167**  -0.195*  -0.154 
      (0.002) (0.073)  (0.108)  (0.102) 
Growth        0.005 -0.019  0.073 
        (0.068) (0.087)  (0.106) 
Age 0.000 -0.000  -0.001   -0.001  -0.004* -0.001 -0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Size 0.186*** 0.190***  0.098***   0.103***  0.098 0.103*** 0.096 
 (0.014) (0.017)  (0.021)   (0.022)  (0.079) (0.023) (0.069) 
Traded Locally 0.078*** 0.083***  0.013   0.014  -0.012 0.015 -0.050 
 (0.026) (0.025)  (0.029)   (0.031)  (0.116) (0.091) (0.216) 
Traded Locally*Dividends (1873-82)          -0.004 -0.020* 
          (0.006) (0.011) 
Traded Locally*Board size          0.876 2.245* 
          (0.929) (1.146) 
Board Size 1.843*** 1.502***  0.652*   0.980**  0.985 0.574* 0.542 
 (0.343) (0.351)  (0.388)   (0.476)  (0.921) (0.315) (0.491) 
Ruling Class Directors -0.102 -0.140  -0.124   -0.155  -0.102 -0.097 0.048 
 (0.082) (0.088)  (0.151)   (0.177)  (0.370) (0.155) (0.340) 
Directorial Qualifications 6.931*** 8.591***  5.250**   5.124**  5.147 5.672* 8.799 
 (1.598) (1.766)  (2.591)   (2.551)  (17.020) (2.933) (16.071) 
Uncalled Capital -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.001**   -0.002**  -0.002 -0.001*** -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Cap on Votes -0.020 -0.021  0.017   0.011  0.169 0.009 0.175 
 (0.025) (0.023)  (0.026)   (0.030)  (0.151) (0.028) (0.161) 
Constant -1.391*** -1.449*** 0.821*** -0.338 0.958*** 0.844*** -0.349 0.780*** -0.107 -0.427 -0.083 
 (0.180) (0.214) (0.039) (0.263) (0.051) (0.043) (0.278) (0.063) (1.065) (0.281) (0.927) 
            
Industry Dummies NO YES NO YES NO NO YES NO YES YES YES 
            
Observations 336 336 217 157 212 193 141 81 48 157 48 
R-squared 0.476 0.525 0.254 0.619 0.268 0.227 0.636 0.280 0.699 0.633 0.783 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 per cent level; *** significant at 1 per cent level. 
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Table 13.  Seasoned issues on the capital market (1883-93) regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Dividends (1883) 0.013*** 0.019** 0.020*    
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.010)    
Dividend Payout Ratio    -0.030 0.041 0.004 
    (0.079) (0.100) (0.130) 
Growth  0.219* 0.169  0.269* 0.208 
  (0.120) (0.120)  (0.140) (0.160) 
Age   -0.002*   -0.001 
   (0.001)   (0.002) 
Size   0.010   0.064** 
   (0.028)   (0.031) 
Constant 0.059 -0.037 -0.327 0.213*** 0.081 -0.802** 
 (0.037) (0.050) (0.325) (0.074) (0.098) (0.352) 
       
Industry Dummies NO NO YES NO NO YES 
       
Observations 487 219 206 306 157 146 
R-squared 0.025 0.116 0.190 0.001 0.099 0.156 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 per cent level; *** significant at 1 per 
cent level. 
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Appendix Table 1. Variable definitions for regressions 
Variable Description Data source 
Age Age of firm BOI 
Average Payout Ratio Average percentage of distributable profits paid 
out as a dividend for banks and railways in 1873 
and 1883 
The Bankers’ Magazine; The Economist; Bradshaw’s 
Railway Manual 
Board Size Number of directors scaled by total paid-up (par) 
value in £000s 
BOI for number of directors and IMM for par value 
Cap on Votes Dummy equals 1 if voting is capped, 0 otherwise BOI 
Directorial 
Qualifications 
Shareholding requirement for individual directors 
scaled by total paid-up (par) value (%) 
BOI for shareholding requirement and IMM for par 
value 
Dividends (1873-82) Average dividend paid as a percentage of paid-up 
(par) value of an individual stock for period 
1873-82 
IMM 
Dividends (1880-82) Average dividend paid as a percentage of paid-up 
(par) value of an individual stock for period 
1880-82 
IMM 
Dividends (1883) Dividend paid in 1883 as a percentage of paid-up 
(par) value of an individual stock 
IMM 
Dividend coef. of var. Coefficient of variation of dividend par ratio from 
1873-82 or since firm began if it is less than 10 
years old 
IMM 
Dividend Payout Ratio Percentage of distributable profits paid out as a 
dividend  
Bradshaw’s collection of company accounts at the 
Guildhall Library.  For banks and railways - The 
Bankers’ Magazine; The Economist; Bradshaw’s 
Railway Manual 
Founders Dummy equals 1 if company has founders or 
deferred shares, 0 otherwise 
BOI 
Growth Growth in total revenue between 1881 and 1885 Bradshaw’s collection of company accounts at the 
Guildhall Library.   
Market Power Dummy equals 1 if company is an industry which 
has market power (i.e. railways and utility 
companies) 
BOI 
New security issue % increase in paid-up capital of all equity and 
debt issued between 1883 and 1893 
IMM 
Profit Profit in 1883 as a % of par value Par value from IMM.   Profits from Bradshaw’s 
collection of company accounts at the Guildhall 
Library, The Bankers’ Magazine; The Economist; 
Bradshaw’s Railway Manual. 
Railways Dummy equals 1 if in Railway Industry, 0 
otherwise 
BOI 
Ruling class directors Number of aristocrats or MPs on board of 
directors scaled by size of board of directors 
BOI 
Size Natural log of company market capitalization IMM 
Tobin's Q Market value of assets / book value of total 
assets, 
where market value of assets = book value of 
assets + market value of all equity and debt 
securities – book value of all debt and equity 
securities   
Market value of securities and book value of 
securities – IMM.   
Book value of total assets - Bradshaw’s collection of 
company accounts at the Guildhall Library, The 
Bankers’ Magazine; The Economist; Bradshaw’s 
Railway Manual. 
Traded locally Dummy equals 1 if Head Office is in the same 
city as a market in which stock is traded 
excluding London, 0 otherwise 
Head Office – BOI 
Where stock traded – IMM 
 
Uncalled capital Amount of capital that a shareholder is still liable 
for – it is the difference between subscribed 
nominal and paid-up capital per share 
IMM 
Note: BOI = Burdett’s Official Intelligence; IMM = Investors’ Monthly Manual.  Par value was the term commonly used at this time 
for the paid-up capital of a share. 
